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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LINDA LARSEN and the
STATE OF UTAH by and
through Utah State
Department of Social
Services

)
)
)
)
)
)

PlaintiffsResnondents.

)
)

Case No. 18328

)
VS

)

)

DOUGLAS COLLINA

)
)

DefendantAppellant

)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a paternity action on appeal from the Third
Judicial District Court where Appellant's Motion to Set Aside
Default and for Relief From Judgment brought pursuant to
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was denied.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
Appellant's Motion was denied by the Honorable Maurice
D. Jones following a hearing in the Third Judicial District
Court on February 17, 1982.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Resnondents seek an affirmance of the lower Court's
Order denying Appellant's Motion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents
desire to supplement and clarify the
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Statement of Facts contained in Appellant's Brief as
follows:
On February 9, 1980, a copy of the Sunnnons and Complaint
was served personally upon the Appellant (T. 6). On March 31,
1980, Appellant answered the Complaint by and through his
attorney, Bradley Parker (T. 7).
Pursuant to Stipulation of the Parties and Order of
the Court, blood tests were taken in May of 1980 (T. 9-10).
In his report, a copy of which was attached to Appellant's
Memorandum to the lower Court, Dr. C. W. DeWitt stated that
on the basis of the blood tests, Mr. Collina cannot be
excluded as the father on the basis of either ABO or HL-A
typing, and further stated that the statistical probability
that he is the father of the co-Plaintiff Larsen's child
would be 100 oer cent with one consort and 74 per cent with
two consorts (T. 64-65).
As indicated by Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories,
there is no evidence that co-Plaintiff had sexual relations
with any person other than the Appellant during the period from
December of 1975 to April of 1976, the period of conception
(T. 52).

On June 23, 1980, Interrogatories to Defendant were
sent to Appellant's attorney, Bradley Parker and on August 13,
1980, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, Gerald Conder, sent a
letter to Mr. Parker stating that Plaintiff's attorney had not
received the Answers and requested that the Answers be forSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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warded as soon as possible, or that we be advised if there
were some problem (T. 78).
On August 25, 1980, Gerald Conder filed a }fution to
Strike Defendant's Answer based upon Defendant's failure to
answer the Interrogatories, and the Motion was set for hearing
on September 17, 1980. At that hearing, Gerald Conder
represented to the Court that the Appellant's attorney
(Bradely Parker) indicated that he had been unable to obtain
coo?eration from his client, and Judge Sawaya ordered that
Defendant be granted 15 days from September 17, 1980 in which
to answer the Interrogatories. If the Interrogatories were
not answered, it was the order of the Court that the Answers
be stricken and default entered (T. 18-21).
On October 20, 1980, the County Attorney's Office
received Mr. Parker's

~·.:ithdra.wal

of Counsel dated October 15,

1980. Thereafter, on October 21, 1980, Notice to

Obtai~

Coansel was sent to t:1e Appellant instructing hir. to
new counsel immediately to renresent hin

i~

Nffi:

obt~.in

the matter, or

in the alternative, to appear in his own behalf (T. 23-24).
Because Apµellant failed to comply with the Notice to
Obtain New Counsel, his answer was stricken and Default
Judgment was entered against him on December 17, 1980, more
than two months subsequent to the Order of the Court entered
on October 10, 1980. Furthermore, Appellant had taken no
action to preserve his position in the 57 day elapse of
time between the Notice to Obtain New Counsel and entry of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the Default Judgment (T. 25-28).
Subsequent to the entry of Judgment

Appellant filed

a Complaint against Mr. Parker with the Utah State Bar.
Mr. Parker filed a response dated Aoril 29, 1981, and the
Complaint was dismissed (T, 93).
At the hearing from which this appeal is taken, Mr.
Parker's testimony was presented at the request of the Court
by proffer of counsel, including the contents of Mr. Parker's
response letter to the Utah State Bar (T. 93) 79-81).
for Appellant made no objection to the proffer.

Counsel

Mr. Parker

was present at the hearing pursuant to a Subpoena Duces
Tecum and would have taken the stand to present the facts
articulated in his response letter had not the Court asked
for a proffer (T. 92).
The response letter of Mr. Parker sets forth the facts
as discussed thus far and further states:
"Not only did Mr. Collina fail, after
repeated requests, to contact our office,
but he failed to pay his bill as well. Mr.
Collina, when he finally did make contact
with our office in February of this year,
informed me that he had received a copy of
the filed Withdrawal of Counsel (filed
October 15, 1980), yet chose to take no
action upon receiving this notice. The
judgment in this matter was not entered
until two months later on December 17, 1980.
Mr. Collina, by his own admission in
his com~laint, received our billings and
by his own admission to me received the
Withdrawal of Counsel. It is difficult to
believe that he did not receive our other
corresponsence regarding the tissue tests
and Interrogatories,'' (T. 79-80).
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~·

The letter of Bradley Parker, which was proffered
into evidence without objection by Defendant, further
states that the Appellant "was represented in this matter
to the fullest extent his cooperation would allow." (T. 80).
Consequently, the Court denied Appellant's Motion for
Relief from Judgment (T. 82).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ACTION OF THE LOWER COURT INIENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND SHOULD BE AFFIR11ED.
This Court stated in Airkem Intermountain, Inc.,
v. Parker, (Ut.) 513 P.2d 429 (1973) that "(t)he trial
court is endowed with considerable latitude of discretion in
granting or denying a motion to relieve a party from final
judgment under Rule 60 (b)(l), U.R.C.P. and this court will
reverse the trial court only where an abuse of this discretion
is clearly established."

(At p. 431; see also Board of

Education of Granite School District v. Cox, (Ut.) 384 P.2d
806 (1963);Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., (Ut.) 376 P.2d
951 (1962).) The Court in Airkern further recognized an interest
in the successful parties to protect their judgment and its
effect with the least hardship once a default judgment has
been entered. It has been consistently stated that more than
a claim that Appellant "did not have his day in court" is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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required for a default judgment to be overturned (Airkem, supra;
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., (Ut.) 260 P.2d 741 (1953).)
It has also been held that the courts should not be
indulgent toward a defaulted party if such indulgence would
work an injustice,

inequity or hardship on the opposing

party. (Warren, supra; Chrysler v. Chrysler, (Ut.) 589 P.2d
995 (1956).) In Pitts v. Pine Meadows Ranch Inc., (Ut.) 589
P.2d 767 (1978) this Court refused to reverse a default judgment
because the successful litigants had moved from the country.
To require their presence for a new trial would work an undue
hardship because they most likely would not be able to
attend the proceedings.
The same rationale applies to the facts in this case
since co-Plaintiff Linda Larsen closed her public assistance
case on September 30, 1981, and counsel for the State of Utah
has been unable to contact her and is unaware of her present
whereabouts. Therefore, it would work an undue hardship and
injustice to require the State to go forward with the
presentation of its case absent the testimony and presence
of the co-Plaintiff.
In both Airkem and Warren, this Court held that a party
seeking to vacate a default judgment must show that he used
due diligence in the prosecution of his case and that he was
prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no
control.
In the case of Heath v. Mower, (Ut.) 597

P~2d
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855 (1979),

this Court refused to vacate a default judgment under facts
virtually identical to those in the present case. In Heath,
a Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment brought pursuant
to U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) was denied where Defendant failed to
respond to repeated attempts to contact him regarding the
status of a lawsuit he knew was pending and where he knew
that a hearing had been scheduledand that his counsel had
withdrawn. The Court stated that these actions of the
Defendant vitiated any claims of due diligence and were
therefore fatal to his Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment.
In the present case, the facts show that Appellant was
represented by counsel and participated in the answering of the
Complaint; he then failed to cooperate with counsel and
further failed to respond to attempts by counsel to contact
him regarding the status of the pending lawsuit. Finally,
Appellant knew that his counsel had withdrawn but failed to
timely appoint new counsel. Under these facts and the holding
of Heath, the Appellant has not in the least complied with
the due diligence requirement and the default judgment should
be affirmed.
In the Brief of the Appellant, an argument is made
concerning the probability of Appellant being the father
of the co-Plaintiff's child. In Chrysler, (supra), it was held
that a default appeal is to be decided purely on the circumstanced surrounding occassion of default. The merits of the
case are not to be at issue and are not a basis for a?peal.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Since the arguments of Appellant go to establishment of
paternity (a merit of the case), such contentions should be
ignored by the Court and have no bearing on the final disposition of this case.
Appellant also contends (without cited authority)
that his Affidavit was unopposed and should therefore be
taken as true. This is patently false. The Affidavit was
opposed and successfully contradicted at the hearing by the
proffered testimony of Bradley Parker. In Chrysler (supra)
this Court held that the trial court doesnot have to accept
as true the facts alleged in affidavits of a party or his
attorney despite the fact that there was no cross-examination
on the facts alleged in those affidavits. It should also be
noted that Appellant failed to appear at the hearing.
Appellant cites both Mayhew (supra) and Ney v.
Harrison,

(Ut.) 299 P.2d 1114 (1956) as supportive of the

position that his default should be overturned. These cases
can be easily distinguished from the one at the bar on their
facts. In Ney and Mayhew, the parties against whom default had
been entered relied to their detriment upon a person who was
neither their attorney nor their agent. In Ney, a wife relied
on her husband to answer the Complaint; and in Mayhew
process was served on a person who had previously been, but was
no longer president of a company whose stockholders subsequently
had a default entered against them without any notice of the
µending lawsuit. In these cases, the appellants were granted
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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relief when they, through no fault of their own, mistakenly
relied on a private individual to represent their interest.
The present case and facts are much different.

The

person that Appellant herein alleged relied upon was his
attorney.

However, this reliance was not justifiable since

the Appellant made no effort to contact his attorney when
he knew the case was pending and that the Interrogatories
needed to be answered.

Furthermore, reliance on his attorney

will not suffice to relieve Appellant of the default judgment
under the holding of Warren (supra).

This Court held therein

that "although a judgment may be erroneous and inequitable
equitable relief will not be granted to a party thereto on
the sole ground that the negligence of the attorney, agent,
trustee, or other representative of the present complafnant
prevented a fair trial ... (Id. at 743).

Therefore, reliance of

Appellant on his attorney will not relieve him of the default
judgment even if the acts of his attorney were negligent.
In this case, the facts bear out that Appellant failed
to contact his attorney despite the fact that he knew a
lawsuit was pending; he failed to appoint a new attorney
when notified to do so; and he failed to answer Interrogatories
after being given the chance to do so not once, but twice.
Therefore, this Court should follow the rule of Airkem and hold
that Appellant'·s conduct was not entirely excusable and that
the lower Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
relieve Appellant of the judgment under those circl.llllstances
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II
THE LOWER COURT COMM:ITTED NO ERROR BY ALLEGEDLY
ALLOWING INTO EVIDENCE A :MEMORANDUM WHICH ARGUED
THE RESULTS OF THE BLOOD TESTS AND CONTAINED A
LETTER WRITTEN BY APPELLANT'S FORMER ATTORNEY.
ERROR WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL BY APPELLANT.
SINCE THE DOCUMENT WAS Sil1PLY A MEMORANDUM,
THERE WAS NO REQUIREMENT THAT PRIOR SERVICE BE
MADE TO APPELLANT.
Appellant fails to mention in his Brief to this Court
that he quoted verbatim the contents of the letter from
Dr. C. W. DeWitt in his Memorandlllil to the lower Court and
attached a copy of the letter to his Memorandum.

Further-

more, Appellant quotes affirmatively the contents of the DeWitt
letter in his Brief to this Court. (at page 6).

It is in-

conceivable that the use of this letter should be prejudicial
to the Appellant when he has and is using the contents of
that letter in the presentation of his case.
Asstnning arguendo that the documents were incorrectly
received by the lower Court, Appellant has lost the opportunity
to make this argument since he failed to preserve the alleged
error for appeal.

The evidence complained of was offered as a

proffer (as Appellant's Brief admits), and Appellant made
absolutely no objection to or cross-examination of said evidence
(T. 92-94).

Since there was no objectionr Rule 4 of the Utah

Rules of Evidence provides that the judgment cannot be
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overturned for an alleged erroneous admission of evidence
under these circumstances. (See also 5 Am Jur 2d Appeal and
Error §601.)
This Court has consistently recognized this principle
and in White v. Newman, (Ut.) 348 P.2d 343 (1960) held
that where there is no objection made to the admisibility of
evidence, the Court will not entertain such claimed error.
(See also Stragmeyer v. Leatham Brothers, Inc. (Ut.) 439
P.2d 279 (1968); Child v. Child, (Ut.) 322 P.2d 981 (1958);
Pettingill v. Perkins, (Ut.) 272 P.2d 185 (1954); Porcupine
Reservoir Co v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp, (Ut.) 382 P.2d 620
(1964); State v. Gilles, (Ut.) 123 p. 93 (1912).)
Had Appellant's counsel objected to any of the
proffered testimony, memorandum or exhibits at the hearing,
Counsel for the State would have called Mr. Parker, who
was present at the hearing pursuant to a Subpoena Duces Tecum,
to the stand and taken his direct testimony and introduced through
him the documents in question.
It would be grossly unfair to allow Appellant to
accuse the lower Court of error on appeal where Appellant's
counsel stood by without raising any objection while the
alleged error supposedly occurred. Therefore, since Appellant's
counsel made no objection during the hearing as to any of
the questioned evidence submitted by proffer, the alleged error
has not been preserved for appeal and Appellant is not entitled
to renew on this point pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Appellant also contends that error was committed
because the time requirement of Rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure was not satisfied.
It is a far stretch of the imagination to call
Respondent's Memorandum a "motion" and an even farther
stretch to call the supporting documents (the sa.me ones
Appellant used in his Memorandum) attached thereto "affidavits".
3 Am Jur 2d Affidavits §31 states that:
"(An affidavit is a voluntary ex parte
statement reduced to writing and sworn to or
affirmed before someone legally authorized to
administer an oath or affirmation."
Neither of the attached doctmlents were under oath, so
neither can be considered an affidavit.

Furthermore, Respon-

dent's Memorandum was not a motion within the meaning of
U.R.C.P. Rule 6, and its provisions, therefore, do not apply.
Thus, there was no requirement of pre-hearing submission of
the documents and there was no error committed.
POINT III
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED,
INCLUDING THE FINAL JUDGMENT AMOUNT OF THE
L0\\7ER COURT.

47 Am Jur 2d Judgments §1210 states that:
"
. a judgment by default is conclusive, not
only as to the validity of the cause of action
forming the basis of the recovery, but also of
the amount of the defendant's liability on the
cause of action."
(See Epstein v. Chatham Park, Inc., (Del.) 193 A.2d 180;
Sidensparker v. Sidensparker, 52 Me 481; Candee v. Lord,
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
2 NY 269.)Sponsored
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Court should be affirmed without remand.
Appellant submits Pitts (supra) and J.P.W. ·Enterprises Inc. v. Naef, (Ut.) 604 P.2d 486 (1979) as supportive
of the position that this Court should remand to the lower
Court for a determination of the amount of the child support
that should be paid by Appellant.

The cited cases can be

easily distinguished from"the present case on the basis of their
facts. The two cases cited dealt with damage amounts that were
very difficult to measure or substantiate and therefore
necessitated a subsequent hearing to take evidence on the
amount of damages that should be paid.
In the present case, the damages (State child support
expenditures) are easily ascertained. The State has the
authority to seek full reimbursement of the amount expended
on behalf of the Appellant's child and this amount is easily
discerned from public records. Therefore, the amount
expended or to be expended on Appellant's child does not
require a great deal of evidentiary intake and the amount of
damage is not nebulous enough to require a remand under the
holdings of Pitts and J.P.W. Enterprises.
By its nature, a default hearing requires no evidence
with regard to the amount of damages where the damages
requested are specific. The amount prayed for in a Complaint
is routinely accepted as the correct amount. Furthermore, the
Appellant failed to bring the question of the amount of child
support before the lower Court. In fact, this is the first
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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time the issue of amount of damages has been raised as an
issue by Appellant.

Since this is an appeal, Appellant should

not be permitted to raise an issue which has not been brought
before the lower Court.
The appropriate remedy for the Appellant on this issue
would be to file a Petition for Modification of the Support
Order rather than to seek a remand to reopen the default
judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, Respondent respectfully
asks this Court to affirm the judgment of the lower Court.
Respectfully submitted,
TED CANNON
Salt Lake County Attorney

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondents to Steven L. Hansen, attorney
for the Appellant, at 4872 Poplar Street, Murray, Utah 84107
on this J...:::_ day of November, 1982 .
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